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Prior to 1861, several U.S. states established bank liability insurance schemes. One type was an
insurance fund. Member banks paid into a state-run fund that paid bank creditors’ losses. A second
scheme was a mutual guarantee system. Member banks were legally responsible for the liabilities
of any insolvent bank. This paper’s hypothesis is that the moral hazard problem was controlled
under a scheme to the degree that member banks had the power and incentive to control or modify
others’ risk-taking behavior. Schemes that gave member banks both strong incentives and power
were able to control the moral hazard problem better than schemes in which one or both features
were weak. Empirical evidence on bank failures and losses on banks’ asset portfolios is consistent
with this hypothesis.
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Moral hazard is inherent in all insurance. Bank liability insurance is not an exception,
as our recent ﬁnancial experience attests.
Today, bank deposit liabilities are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC), established by the Banking Act of 1933. However, the FDIC was not the ﬁrst
bank liability insurance scheme in the United States. Six states enacted such schemes prior
to the Civil War. Although the banking industry in the ﬁrst half of the 19th century was
quite diﬀerent from what it is today, the moral hazard problems generated by these schemes
were similar.1
Although there were diﬀerences in the exact details of these insurance schemes in the
states that enacted them, they were of two basic types. One was an insurance fund sometimes
called a Safety Fund. The other insurance scheme was a mutual guarantee system.
In the insurance fund schemes, member banks paid a percentage of capital into a
fund controlled by a state banking authority. This authority would then use this fund to
make payments to creditors of failed banks. Payments were capped initially by the amount
in the fund. However, after such payments were made, there was mutualization of losses
because the remaining solvent banks (survivors) potentially could be required to once again
contribute to the fund to restore it to its requisite level. The responsibility for supervising
member banks lay with a state banking authority, which had limited powers. Individual
banks had little or no ability to control or modify the risk-taking behavior of other banks in
the system.
The mutual guarantee systems did not have insurance funds. Instead, creditors of
member banks that became insolvent were reimbursed directly and immediately out of the
assets of surviving banks. The body overseeing these systems was a Board of Directors, and
its powers were greater than those of the banking authorities in the insurance fund states.
Further, individual banks had direct power to control or modify the risk-taking behavior
of other banks in the system because each bank in the system had a representative on the
Board.
Insurance funds schemes were enacted in three states: Michigan, New York, Vermont.
Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio set up mutual guarantee systems. Here I focus on only four of these
states, New York, Vermont, Indiana, and Ohio. I omit the schemes in Michigan and Iowa
because they were in operation for only a short period of time. I ﬁnd that the experience
of the four states in terms of their ability to control moral hazard was quite diﬀerent. My
hypothesis is that the diﬀerences are consistent with the notion that how well a bank liability
insurance scheme controlled moral hazard depended on how much power and incentive the
banks involved in the scheme had to take actions to control or modify other member banks’
risk-taking behavior. These diﬀerences also demonstrate that both power and incentives to
directly aﬀect other member banks’ risk-taking behavior are important. Schemes with both
features control moral hazard better than those with only one.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe how the two types of
1That moral hazard could be a problem with bank liability insurance schemes was recognized from the
beginning. According to Chaddock (1910), 265, during the debate on the New York Safety Fund law,
“another representative, Mr. Hubbell, pointed out that the very existence of such a fund would relax ‘public
scrutiny and watchfulness which now serve to restrain or detect malconduct.’ ”insurance schemes diﬀered in terms of how much power banks had to aﬀect the risk-taking
behavior of each other. I also show that the banks in mutual guarantee systems had more
power over other banks than did banks in the insurance funds. In the third section, I rank
the insurance schemes in the four states in terms of how much incentive an individual bank
had to control or modify the risk-taking behavior of other banks in the system. I show
that the banks in the New York Safety Fund had the weakest incentives and that those in
Indiana’s mutual guarantee system had the greatest. In Section 4, I analyze how well these
schemes controlled moral hazard by examining empirical evidence on bank suspensions of
specie payments, bank failures and losses on banks’ asset portfolios is consistent with this
hypothesis. I ﬁnd that the evidence bank failures and losses on banks’ asset portfolios aligns
well with my hypothesis. The evidence on suspensions of specie payments does not. The
ﬁnal section has a summary and concluding remarks.
2. Power to change risk-taking behavior
A. Insurance funds
The New York Safety Fund was established in 1829. Banks chartered after the Safety
Fund law was passed were required to join the fund.2 Although the New York fund technically
lasted until 1863, it eﬀectively stopped providing insurance after 1842.
The Vermont insurance fund was established in 1831. Banks chartered after 1831
were required to join the fund. However, after 1841 newly chartered banks could choose
whether or not to join, and rechartered banks could choose whether or not to continue in the
fund.3 The result was that beginning in 1859 the Vermont fund had no participating banks.
Both insurance funds had virtually the same basic structure. Upon joining, member
banks were required to pay a percentage of their capital into a fund managed by the state.
These rates were 0.5% of capital per year up to a maximum of 3% in New York and 0.75%
of capital per year up to a maximum of 41
2% of capital in Vermont. Both funds guaranteed
all of the liabilities of banks in the fund.4
The activities of the banks in the fund were supervised by bank commissioners em-
ployed by the state.5 The bank commissioners, of which there were only three in each state,
were given full access to bank records. However, the power of these commissioners was lim-
ited. In New York, a bank could be closed only if it were “insolvent, or shall have violated
any of the provisions of their act or acts of incorporation” (New York law, sec. 18). Simi-
larly, the bank commissioners in Vermont could close banks only if they were insolvent or
had violated the provisions of the act establishing the safety fund. Banks in the New York
2Banks chartered before the law was passed did not have to join. However, 16 of the 40 existing banks
chose to be rechartered and be a part of the system, and 11 new banks were chartered when the law was
passed.
3If a bank chose not to participate in the fund, the bank’s directors had to post personal bonds equal to
the bank’s capital. If a rechartered bank chose not to rejoin the Vermont fund, its contribution was returned
as was the case with New York Safety Fund banks.
4The exception was that beginning in 1837 New York provided that noteholders, but not depositors
or other creditors, would be paid immediately. However, payments from the New York Safety Fund to
noteholders could only continue as long as one-third of the capital of the fund (which amounted to $914,342.24
on January 1, 1841) was held to meet debts other than notes of insolvent banks.
5The establishment of such supervisory agencies was an innovation at the time.
2and Vermont insurance funds could not be closed simply for bad management or taking on
too risky a portfolio of loans.
More importantly, from the point of view of this paper, in neither state did the laws
contain any provision for banks to directly aﬀect the risk-taking behavior of the other banks
in the system. In New York, for example, the most that a bank could do was get a bank
examined “more frequently than once every four months, if required to do so by any three
of the moneyed corporations subject to the provisions of this act” (sec. 16). Vermont’s law
contained no provisions concerning member banks’ ability to monitor each other.
B. Mutual Guarantee Systems
The mutual guarantee systems went under the name of “State Bank of ...,” or “Bank
of the State of ....” Banks that were members of the systems were called branches. For
example, the bank in Indianapolis that was a member of the Indiana system was called
the Indianapolis Branch of the State Bank of Indiana. The State Bank of Indiana had
13 branches. The State Bank of Ohio had 41 branches, although throughout most of its
existence fewer than 41 were in operation. The State Bank of Indiana was in existence from
1834 until 1857, when it ceased doing business before its charter expired in 1859. It was
replaced by the Bank of the State of Indiana, which was another mutual guarantee system.
The State Bank of Ohio began in 1845 and lasted until 1863, when its branches converted
to national banks.
Despite being called branches, the member banks of these systems were independent
banks, not branches of a parent bank. Each branch had its own stockholders and issued its
own notes that were redeemable only at that branch. Further, “its own proﬁts [were to] be
divided among its own Stockholders” (sec. 14 of the Indiana law). The entity known as the
“State Bank of ...” did no actual banking business whatsoever.
These systems were mutual guarantee schemes because each branch was responsible
for at least some of the liabilities of the other branches. In Indiana, the branches mutually
guaranteed “all debts, notes, and engagements of each other.”6 In Ohio, the law stated that
“[e]ach solvent branch shall contribute ...to the sum necessary for redeeming the notes of
the failing branch.”7
Each system was overseen by the Board of Directors of the State Bank. The powers
of the Board of Directors in both Indiana and Ohio were greater than that of the bank
commissioners of the insurance funds. For example, the Board of Directors of the State
Bank of Indiana was required to suspend a branch’s operations if a branch was “insolvent,
or is mismanaging its aﬀairs, whereby the interest of other Branches is endangered, ...or
[has] refused to comply with any legal order or directions of the Board of Directors of the
State Bank.” (sec. 44, italics added). Further, it had the “power to limit and control the
amounts of discounts and loans of the Branches after they amount to once and a quarter
the amount of capital stock paid in” (sec. 40) and to “regulate and control the dividends of
proﬁts so that the capital stock shall never be diminished” (sec. 54).8
6State of Indiana (1849), sec. 9, p. 6.
7State of Ohio (1845), sec. 26, p. 35.
8As an example that the Board of Directors of the State Bank of Indiana utilized these powers, it wrote
to the Lafayette Branch in 1838:
3More importantly, from this paper’s viewpoint, the laws under which the mutual
guarantee systems operated gave individual banks the direct ability to regulate the behavior
of the other member banks. The Board of Directors of the State Bank in both systems was
comprised of members appointed by the state legislature and one director from each
branch.
3. Incentives to change risk-taking behavior
Under all of these systems, the other banks had a direct, one-sided ﬁnancial stake
in the outcome of the other banks. A bank could possibly share the losses (the downside)
incurred by another bank. In the insurance fund scheme, this occurred because banks were
potentially subject to additional assessments whenever the fund was reduced by payments to
creditors of failed banks. Further, these assessments could continue until the funds returned
to their requisite amounts, so that, in eﬀect, banks could continue to be assessed without
limit. In the mutual guarantee scheme, this occurred because any losses were paid immedi-
ately out of the assets of the surviving branches. If the losses were large enough, a branch’s
capital could be completely wiped out by the failure of another branch. However, a bank
did not share in the proﬁts (the upside) of another bank. Those proﬁts went strictly to the
shareholders of that bank.
As a result, it would seem that the banks in all four of these schemes had incentives
to control and modify the risk-taking behavior of other banks. To determine the extent to
which banks in these schemes were exposed to the risks taken by other banks, I computed the
potential exposure to loss of an average bank that was a member of one of these insurance
schemes if an average bank in the scheme failed.
A. New York
For banks in the New York Safety Fund, I computed the potential exposure to losses
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where N is the number of banks in the insurance scheme before the failure. That is, I
computed the fraction of capital that the average surviving member bank would have to pay
The requirement of Mr. [the cashier of the branch]’s resignation was not considered by any one
of the State Board as a matter personal towards him, but he had been guilty of several matters
which the Branch board had refused to disapprove.... All that the State board expect is that
your branch shall by its safe, prudent and honorable management recover and retain public
conﬁdence.... I suppose this might be done much more eﬀectually even than by removing the
Cashier if your Directors who are large borrowers would resign and the places could be supplied
by prudent sensible men, not borrowers.... The State Board must have assurance that matters
will be managed otherwise or your branch must and will be suspended. (from Golembe and
Warburton (1958), IV-20)
The cashier resigned. Others examples are that the Lawrenceburg branch was suspended for a time for
showing favoritism to certain stockholders and directors in making loans and the Bedford, Michigan City,
and South Bend branches were also criticized for their lending practices. Golembe and Warburton (1958),
IV-21
4creditors of an average failing bank.
In this computation, I assumed the assets of the failing bank were only enough to cover
half of its outstanding liabilities. The reason for reducing the amount for which surviving
banks would be responsible by some fraction of the assets of the failed banks is that under
the New York Safety Fund system creditors would be paid ﬁrst out of any receipts from the
sales of assets of the failed bank. Only after the asset recovery process had been completed
would creditors be paid out of the Safety Fund and only then would other insured banks be
assessed to replenish the Fund. My assumption that the recovery rate of 50% is arbitrary,
but as will be seen below it is in the ballpark of what was actually recovered in the case of
New York Safety Fund bank failures.
Table 1 displays the number of banks in the Safety Fund for which I have data, their
average capital, the average amount due from the Fund from the failure of an average bank,
and the exposure such a failure would mean in terms of dollars and as a fraction of average
capital.9 The table shows that for a New York Safety Fund bank, the exposures were quite
small: less than 1% of capital for a bank with a capital stock equal to the average. This
means that if one bank that was a member of the Safety Fund were to fail and its assets were
only enough to cover half of its outstanding liabilities, then every other bank would be liable
for an amount equal to approximately 1% of its capital stock to restore the Fund. These
numbers remain small: 3% of capital (or less) for New York banks even under the extreme
assumption that no assets of the failed bank were ever available to pay oﬀ creditors.10
Number of Average Exposure
banks Average due creditors % of
Date reporting capital from Fund $ capital
1/1/1835 76 345,151 165,435 2,206 0.6
1/1/1836 77 344,564 241,979 3,184 0.9
1/1/1837 89 358,443 249,637 2,837 0.8
1/1/1838 87 361,380 110,438 1,285 0.4
Table 1: Exposure of banks in the New York Safety Fund, 1835-1838
However, in actuality the exposures of New York Safety Fund banks were less than
the computations in Table 1 indicate, because the link between the failure of a bank and
losses to other banks was indirect for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that there was a cap of 0.5%
of capital per year on how much a bank could be required to contribute. The second is that
the additional assessments that surviving would face due to a bank’s failure would not begin
until the failing bank had been liquidated, which could take a substantial period of time.
The evidence on how special assessments were handled illustrates the length of the
delay between bank failures and assessments on the remaining solvent banks. New York
9The table is limited to the years 1835-1838 because these are the only years during which the Fund was
operating and for which good data exist. The number of banks does not equal the number of banks in the
Fund because not all banks reported at the times given in the table.
10This assumption is extreme because all failing banks had some specie on hand that could be used to pay
creditors.
5experienced one bank failure in 1837 and six more in 1840 and 1841. Yet, banks that were
still members of the Safety Fund were not subject to special assessments until January
1842, and although the Fund had not been restored to its requisite level, (almost) no special
assessments took place in 1844. Additional assessments began again only when special bonds
were issued by the state in 1845 to pay oﬀ the creditors of the failed banks. They continued
until 1866 when these bonds were fully paid oﬀ.
B. Vermont
I compute the potential exposures of banks in the Vermont Safety Fund using the same
formula that I used for the New York Safety Funds banks. The exposures are displayed in
Table 2. The exposures of a Vermont Safety Fund bank with a capital stock equal to the
average were larger than those of New York banks, but they are still mostly below 5% of
capital. However, they rise to between 10% and 20% under the assumption that no assets
of a failed bank were available to pay oﬀ creditors.
Number of Average Exposure
banks Average due creditors % of
Date reporting capital from Fund $ capital
July-October 1833 7 42,857 23,660 3,943 9.2
August-October 1835 9 48,333 28.490 3,561 7.4
July-October 1837 11 56,364 19,493 1,949 3.5
September-October 1839 11 56,436 29,510 2,951 5.2
August 1840 10 59,629 12,534 1,393 2.3
June-October 1843 15 64,667 16,533 1,181 1.8
August 1845 13 64,489 17,692 1,474 2.3
August-September 1848 14 78,693 13,699 1,054 1.3
August 1850 10 90,311 31,435 3,493 3.9
July-August 1852 10 97,500 42,158 4,684 4.8
July-August 1855 7 89,286 34,839 5,806 6.5
Table 2: Exposure of banks in the Vermont Safety Fund, selected years, 1833-1855
However, for the same two reasons that the exposures of New York Safety Fund
banks were actually smaller than indicated by the computations in Table 1, the exposures
of Vermont Safety Fund banks also were actually smaller than those shown in Table 2. Like
New York, Vermont banks had a cap (0.75% of capital per year) on how much a bank could
be required to contribute to restore the fund after a bank failure.
Once again, the evidence on how special assessments were handled illustrates the
length of the delay between bank failures and assessments on the remaining solvent banks.
The ﬁrst failure of a Vermont Safety Fund bank was the Essex County Bank. It failed in
1839. The remaining banks that were members of the Vermont insurance fund did not face
special assessments until 1852. Further, these assessments ended in 1855. No assessments
were made after the only other failure, that of the Danby Bank in 1857, because there were
no banks remaining in the fund at this point.
6C. State Bank of Indiana
Because the payments to creditors of failed banks were to be made immediately from
the assets of the surviving banks, I calculated the exposure of the branches of the State Bank
of Indiana diﬀerently than I did for the banks in the New York and Vermont insurance fund
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
,
In other words, I assumed that only the cash on hand in the failing branch could be used
to immediately pay creditors. The remainder had to be paid immediately from the assets of
the surviving branches.
Table 3 displays the exposures of the branches of the State Bank of Indiana. Although
these numbers vary between 5% and 29%, for the most part they are around 16%. The major
reason why the exposure was so high is that there were only a few branches (the maximum
was 13) over which to spread the losses.
Number of Average Exposure
bbranches Average due creditors % of
Date reporting capital from Fund $ capital
11/21/1835 10 119,978 258,454 27,828 27.8
11/26/1836 11 144,134 423,440 42,344 29.4
9/2/1837 11 167,727 317,544 31,754 18.9
11/17/1838 13 170,515 210,692 17,558 10.3
11/21/1840 13 205,509 218,920 18,243 8.9
11/21/1841 13 211,015 220,989 18,416 8.7
11/21/1842 13 209,810 134,620 11,218 5.4
11/21/1843 13 163,889 152,968 12,747 7.8
11/21/1844 13 161,478 212,390 17,699 11.0
11/21/1845 13 154,453 254,438 21,203 13.7
11/21/1846 13 160,294 269,842 22,487 14.0
11/20/1847 13 160,221 301,638 25,136 15.7
11/17/1849 13 160,224 287,097 23,925 14.9
11/16/1850 13 160,227 290,272 24,185 15.1
10/31/1851 13 160,231 313,202 26,100 16.3
11/2/1852 13 160,231 360,099 31,008 18.7
10/31/1853 13 165,393 366,230 30,519 18.4
10/31/1854 13 165,393 300,641 25,053 15.2
10/31/1855 13 164,953 346,788 28,899 17.5
10/31/1856 13 165,393 368,905 30,742 18.6
Table 3: Exposure of branches of the State Bank of Indiana, 1835-1856
7D. State Bank of Ohio
The State Bank of Ohio mutual guarantee scheme only covered noteholders. For this
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In other words, I assumed that the notes were the only liabilities that had to be paid oﬀ and
that the cash on hand in the failing branch could be used to immediately pay noteholders.
The remainder had to be paid immediately from the assets of the surviving branches.
Table 4 displays the exposures of the branches of the State Bank of Ohio. They are
on the order of 3.5%. They are substantially lower that the exposures of the branches of
the State Bank of Indiana, however. There are two reasons for this. First, only notes were
covered; second, there were more branches over which to spread potential losses.
Number of Average Exposure
branches Average due creditors % of
Date reporting capital from Fund $ capital
2/1/1846 16 64,420 56,794 3,786 5.9
11/1/1846 16 87,297 105,448 6,590 7.6
5/1/1848 37 89,240 96,507 2,608 2.9
11/1/1849 40 110,690 136,814 3,420 3.1
2/1/1851 41 115,793 161,646 3,942 3.4
2/1/1854 38 113,005 156,595 4,121 3.6
11/1/1854 37 110,932 141,189 3,816 3.4
2/1/1856 36 113,736 159,429 4,428 3.9
11/1/1856 36 114,292 159,969 4,444 3.9
2/1/1858 32 116,391 120,874 3,777 3.2
11/1/1858 36 114,569 148,049 4,112 3.6
2/1/1860 35 115,307 149,027 4,259 3.7
Table 4: Exposure of branches of the State Bank of Ohio, 1846-1860
These exposures are also greater than those of the banks in the New York Safety Fund,
but are on the order of those in the Vermont Safety Fund. Nonetheless, I would argue that
the exposure of the branches of the State Bank of Ohio was greater than that of the Vermont
Safety Fund banks because the branches could be called on immediately to pay the insured
creditors of the failed branch. No delay would occur, as was the case with the Vermont
insurance fund. If a receiver were to subsequently get something for the assets of the failed
branch, these receipts would be rebated to the other branches. However, that process could
take a long time, but the payments to the creditors of the failed bank immediately went out
the doors of the other branches.
84. Degree of control of moral hazard
Table 5 displays a summary of the above discussion of the power and incentives that
banks in these bank liability insurance schemes had to control or modify the risk-taking
behavior of other banks in the scheme. Banks in the New York and Vermont Safety Fund
schemes had no power and weak incentives to control or modify the behavior of other banks.
Under our hypothesis, moral hazard should have been poorly controlled in these systems.
At the other extreme, Branches of the State Bank of Indiana had both strong power and
incentives to control other branches, and according to our hypothesis, moral hazard should
have been well controlled in this scheme. The Branches of the State Bank of Ohio had
the same power as the branches of the State Bank of Indiana but their incentive to control
the behavior or other branches was weaker because only notes were insured. Therefore, the
control of moral hazard should have been better than under the two safety fund schemes,





New York Safety Fund
Vermont Safety Fund
medium State Bank of Ohio
strong State Bank of Indiana
Table 5:
In this section I examine the extent to which the experience of these insurance schemes
in controlling moral hazard aligns with my hypothesis. To do this, I measure the degree of
control of moral hazard in three ways: by the frequency and duration of suspensions of bank
note redemption, by the number of bank failures, and by the sizes of losses on the asset
portfolio of failed banks.
A. Bank suspensions
Bank liability insurance removes the incentive for creditors to monitor banks. As a
result, the moral hazard problem could show up as banks holding smaller amounts of specie
and hence being more susceptible to runs. Other banks in the insurance scheme, however,
would have the incentive to regulate the specie-holding behavior of other banks, because a run
on one bank could spread to other, sound banks. Less frequent suspensions or suspensions
of shorter duration would provide evidence that moral hazard was better controlled to the
degree that banks had to regulate this behavior.
I ﬁnd that the evidence from bank suspensions does not align well with the ranking
suggested above. Bank suspensions were less frequent and of shorter duration for New York
and Vermont Safety Fund banks, which had little power to regulate other banks, than for
branches of the State Bank of Indiana, which had a lot of power to regulate other branches.
Further, branches of the State Bank of Ohio, which had the same power but less incentive
9to regulate other branches as did branches of the State Bank of Indiana, never suspended.
The ﬁrst major bank suspension episode that occurred after some of these insurance
schemes were in place began in May 1837. All banks in the three insurance schemes in
existence at the time suspended specie payments on their notes. New York Safety Fund
banks suspended on May 9, 1837; Vermont Safety Fund banks, on May 10; branches of the
State Bank of Indiana, prior to May 19.
However, the suspensions of the New York and Vermont Safety Fund banks were
of shorter duration than the suspension by the State Bank of Indiana. The New York and
Vermont Safety Fund banks resumed in May 1838. The State Bank of Indiana did not resume
until August 13, 1838. Further, the State Bank of Indiana suspended again in November
1839 and did not resume payments until June 15, 1842. The Safety Fund banks in New York
and Vermont did not suspend for a second time in the fall of 1839.
The second major bank suspension that occurred after some of these insurance schemes
were in place occurred in late 1857. The only insurance scheme that was eﬀectively in exis-
tence was the State Bank of Ohio. The New York Safety Fund had essentially ceased being
able to provide insurance, Vermont’s insurance fund had almost no banks as members, and
the State Bank of Indiana ceased doing business on January 1, 1857.
The branches of the State Bank of Ohio did not suspend during this panic.11 However,
the argument can be made that the State Bank of Ohio put in place a partial suspension,
because it took extraordinary actions to make it more diﬃcult for noteholders to present
notes for redemption. In particular, it permitted branches to pay out notes of other Branches
(such a practice was usually prohibited), making it more diﬃcult for notes to be presented for
redemption. To help facilitate this, “the clerk of the Board of Control, upon receiving notes
from one Branch Bank, would return a mixed package of notes of other, distant, Branch
Banks.” (Golembe and Warburton (1958), VI-30)
The diﬀerences in the suspension experiences may have had nothing to do with dif-
ferences in the power and incentives that banks had to control the specie reserve behavior
of other banks in an insurance scheme, however. The reason is that all banks, insured and
uninsured, had a strong incentive not to suspend. All banks were legally prohibited from
suspending specie payments on their notes. If a bank did suspend, banking authorities had
the power to close the bank.
Nonetheless, there were times when specie payments were suspended. These sus-
pensions occurred when for some reason a large number of banks in a city or state faced
the possibility of running out of specie and therefore being unable to redeem their notes
on demand. In such cases, banking authorities would usually permit widespread (citywide
or statewide) suspensions of payments to occur with no threat of closing the banks. Since
the conditions that would have led to suspensions were likely to have been general across
regions and probably would have aﬀected all banks whether insured or not, state banking
authorities would have had diﬃculty permitting a certain class of banks to save specie and
suspend while not allowing other banks facing the same specie demands to do the same.
As a result, the suspension and resumption behavior of insured and uninsured banks
was similar within and across states in the same region. For example, in the Panic of 1837,
11The branches of the Bank of the State of Indiana, the mutual guarantee insurance system that replaced
the State Bank of Indiana, also did not suspend during this panic(Van Vleck (1967), 73, n. 17).
10all banks in New York suspended and resumed at exactly the same time. The same was true
for all banks in New England. The timing of the suspensions and resumptions of the State
Bank of Indiana was similar to that of banks in Pennsylvania. And in the Panic of 1857,
banks in Ohio that were not branches of the State Bank also did not suspend at this time.12
B. Bank failures
The moral hazard problem with bank liability insurance could also show up as insured
banks holding riskier asset portfolios than noninsured banks. Therefore, insured banks should
be more likely to fail than noninsured banks. Other banks in the insurance scheme, however,
would have the incentive to regulate the riskiness of other banks’ portfolios, because they
could potentially share the losses due to a bank’s failure but not share any gains if a bank
were to continue in business. If control of moral hazard is greater to the degree that banks
have the power and incentives to regulate the behavior of others (my hypothesis), then the
State Bank of Indiana should have had the fewest failures, followed by Ohio. New York and
Vermont should have had the highest failure rates.
Number Failed Failure Rate Received Aid
State Bank of Indiana 13 0 0 0
State Bank of Ohio 36 4 11.1 6
New York Safety Fund 90 10 11.1 0
Vermont Safety Fund 22 2 9.1 0
Table 6: Failure rates for safety fund and mutual guarantee banks
The bank failure experience for the four insurance schemes is displayed in Table 6.
The experience of the State Bank of Indiana is consistent with my hypothesis, because the
State Bank of Indiana experienced no bank failures. However, the bank failure evidence from
the other three schemes aligns only moderately well with this ranking. The State Bank of
Ohio, which should have had a higher failure rate than the State Bank of Indiana, in fact
did. However, its failure rate should have been lower than that for banks in the New York
and Vermont safety funds. In actuality, its failure rate was about the same or even higher if
the number of banks that required additional assistance were included.
The reason the failure rates do not align more closely with the power and incentives
of banks to regulate the behavior of other banks may be that for for New York, Vermont,
and Ohio the incentive eﬀect was small. As shown above, the expected loss to a bank from
the failure of another bank in these schemes was a relatively small fraction of capital.
The bank failure data also allow another comparison. The control of bank risk-taking
behavior by creditors of noninsured banks can be compared with the control that supervisors
or other banks exerted over banks that are part of insurance schemes. I do this by doing a
state-by-state comparison of the failure experience of insured banks with similar noninsured
banks both within the state and in similar states.
12The exception was the Ohio Life and Trust Company. The Panic of 1857 is sometimes attributed to the
failure of this bank.
11New York
During the period 1830-1843, which is roughly when the New York Safety Fund was
actually insuring banks, two other types of banks were in existence in New York: chartered
banks, banks that were in existence before the Fund was put in place and had been exempted
from participating in it, and free banks. The number of each of these types of banks that
were in existence, the number that failed, and the failure rates during this period are shown
in Table 7. Also shown is the same information for banks in Massachusetts, New Jersey
and Pennsylvania over the same period. These states were similar to New York in that they
had large populations and well-developed banking systems since at least the early 1800s.
Further, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania each had a major ﬁnancial center. However, none
of these states had a bank liability insurance scheme.
Number Failed Failure Rate
New York Safety Fund, chartered 90 10 11.1
New York Non-Safety Fund, chartered 10 0 0
Massachusetts 134 9 6.7
Pennsylvania 52 5 9.6
New Jersey 32 4 12.5
New York free 91 24 26.4
Table 7: Failure rates for New York Safety Fund and non-Safety Fund banks, and for Mas-
sachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania banks, 1830-1843
The evidence in Table 7 is mixed as to how well risk-taking behavior was controlled
for the Safety Fund banks as compared with the control exercised by creditors of noninsured
banks. In support of the argument that risk-taking behavior was comparably not well con-
trolled, the failure rate for Safety Fund banks was higher than that for chartered banks that
were not in the Safety Fund and almost twice the failure rate for banks in Massachusetts. In
support of the other position, the failure rate for New York Safety Fund banks was approx-
imately the same as that for banks in New Jersey and Pennsylvania and was much lower
than that for free banks, more than a quarter of which failed.
Vermont
Next, for the time period 1832-1858, I compare the failure rates of insured Vermont
banks with those of noninsured Vermont banks and banks in Maine and New Hampshire. I
choose these two states for comparison because they are in the upper part of New England
and were similar to Vermont in terms of demographics. Neither state had an insurance fund.
The evidence in Table 8 is also mixed as to how well risk-taking behavior was con-
trolled for the Safety Fund banks as compared witn the control exercised by creditors of
noninsured banks. In support of the argument that risk-taking behavior was comparably
not well controlled, the failure rate for Safety Fund banks was higher than that banks that
were not in the Vermont Safety Fund and for banks in New Hampshire. In support of the
argument that it was comparably well controlled, the failure rate for Vermont Safety Fund
12Number Failed Failure Rate
Vermont in bank fund 22 2 9.1
Vermont not in fund 41 2 4.9
New Hampshire 28 2 7.1
Maine 60 7 11.7
Table 8: Failure rates for Vermont banks both in and not in the insurance fund and for
Maine and New Hampshire banks, 1832-1858
banks was lower than that for banks in Maine.
Ohio
Lastly, I compare the failure rates for branches of the State Bank of Ohio with those
of similar banks in the state at the time. During the period 1845-1860 when the State Bank
of Ohio was in existence, there were eﬀectively two other types of banks in the state:13
1. Independent banks – The law establishing the State Bank of Ohio also permitted banks
to be organized under the same general restrictions as branches of the State Bank of
Ohio except that instead of being part of the mutual guarantee system they had to
“deposit with and transfer to the treasurer of state certiﬁcates of the funded debt of
this state, or of the United States, at least equal in amount to the amount of its capital
stock. ...”(State of Ohio (1845), sec. 30, p. 36)
2. Free banks – These were banks established after 1851 that operated under free banking
laws.
The evidence in Table 9 is also mixed as to how well risk-taking behavior was con-
trolled for the Safety Fund banks as compared to the control exercised by creditors of non-
insured banks. In support of the argument that risk-taking behavior was comparably well
controlled, the branches of the State Bank of Ohio had lower failure rates than the Indepen-
dent banks. In support of the argument that it was not well controlled: If the number of
number of branches that received aid is combined with the number failing, the failure rate
of branches of the State Bank of Ohio becomes almost 28%. Further, free Banks had a low
rate of failures, 6.7 percent.
C. Losses on assets of failed banks
The moral hazard problem with bank liability insurance could also show up as losses
on the asset portfolios of failed banks because insured banks have more incentive to hold
riskier asset portfolios than do noninsured banks. Here, I present data on the size of losses
on asset portfolios of failed banks that led to losses for creditors or to payments to creditors
by the insurance fund or by other banks in the insurance scheme. If control of moral hazard
13I ignore the “Old banks,” – banks chartered before 1845 that operated under their old charters – because
most of them were in shaky ﬁnancial condition when the State Bank of Ohio went into operation.
13Number Failed Failure Rate Received Aid
State Bank Branches 36 4 11.1 6
Free banks 15 1 6.7 0
Independent banks 13 2 15.4 0
Table 9: Failure rates for Ohio banks by type, 1845-1860
is greater the greater the power and incentives of banks to regulate the behavior of others,
then, following the arguments made above, New York and Vermont should have had the
largest losses on assets, and branches of the State Bank of Indiana should have had the
smallest losses. The losses of failed branches of the State Bank of Ohio should have fallen
somewhere in between.
The experience of the State Bank of Indiana is consistent with my hypothesis. There
were no losses on the asset portfolios of failed branches because the State Bank of Indiana
experienced no branch failures. However, as was the case with the bank failure evidence,
the evidence on losses on the asset portfolios of failed banks under the other three schemes
aligns only moderately well with the ranking suggested by my hypothesis.
New York
To estimate the amount of losses on the asset portfolios of the New York Safety
Fund banks, I ﬁrst estimated the amount of good assets that a bank had by subtracting
the “Claims against the insurance system” as estimated by Golembe and Warburton (1958),
Table 12 from the bank’s total liabilities. My reasoning is that liabilities that were not paid
by the Fund had to have been paid out of the assets of the bank, which meant that this
assets would have been good. I then estimated the losses on the asset portfolio at time of
failure as the diﬀerence between total assets and good assets. I use two measures of total
assets at time of failure. The ﬁrst, shown in column 3 of Table 10, is “Obligations at the last
report prior to suspension or diﬃculty, Total” (Golembe and Warburton (1958), Table 11)
plus total capital taken from the bank balance sheets in Weber (2012). The second, shown
in column 4, is total assets from the last available balance sheet in Weber (2012).14
My estimated losses in dollar terms are shown in column 5 of the table and in per-
centage terms in columns 6 and 7. The losses were large, averaging about 80% to 85% of a
failed bank’s assets.15
14The dates of the last balance sheets are 1/1/1837 for the Lockport Bank, 1/1/1840 for the City Bank
of Buﬀalo, 1/23/1841 for the Wayne County Bank and all the banks listed under 1841, and 1/1/1842 for
all the banks listed under 1842. For the 1/23/1841 banks, the item used is total liabilities (which includes
capital) rather than total assets because it appears that several asset items are omitted from the available
balance sheets.
15I exclude the Lafayette Bank and Oswego Bank from these calculations. Given that the failure of these
banks did not require pay outs by the Safety Fund, it is not possible to estimate their losses by my method
except to say that the must have been less than the capital stocks of these banks which are the entries given
in column 5 of the table.
14Assets Estimated losses
Estimated Balance
Year Bank (see text) sheets ($) % (1) %(2)
1837 Lockport Bank 237,000 348,608 136,000 57.4 39.0
1840 City Bank, Buﬀalo 884,000 864,987 717,000 81.1 82.9
Wayne County Bank 312,000 312,221 229,000 73.4 73.4
1841 Commercial, NY 1,089,000 936,674 786,000 72.2 83.9
Bank of Buﬀalo 868,000 653,920 785,000 90.4 100
Commercial Bank, Buﬀalo 1,213,000 1,072,182 1,012,000 83.4 94.4
Commercial Bank, Oswego 572,000 595,316 491,000 85.8 82.5
1842 Watervliet Bank 480,000 509,981 461,000 96.0 90.4
Lafayette Bank 665,000 665,797 <500,000 <75
Clinton County Bank 506,000 540,398 428,000 84.6 79.2
Bank of Lyons 349,000 445,012 296,000 84.8 66.5
Oswego Bank 327,000 337,086 <150,000 <45
Total 10 banks 6,510,000 6,279,299 5,341,000 82.0 85.1
Table 10: Loss rates for New York Safety Fund banks, 1830-1843
Vermont
I estimated losses on the asset portfolios of the two Vermont insurance fund banks in
the same way as I estimated the losses for the New York Safety Fund banks. The data come
from Golembe and Warburton (1958) Table 19 and Weber (2012). In the calculation of good
assets I use “Payments from insurance fund: Claimed” from Table 19. The estimated losses
are displayed in Table 11. The estimated losses are between 50% and 60% of the failing
bank. Even though these losses are lower than the average losses on the portfolios of New
York Safety Fund Banks, they are still quite large.
Assets Estimated losses
Estimated Balance
Year Bank (see text) sheets ($) % (1) %(2)
1839 Essex Bank 99,000 98,838 59,000 59.6 59.7
1857 Danby Bank 133,000 156,729 81,000 60.9 51.7
Table 11: Loss rates for Vermont insurance fund banks, 1839-1857
15The State Bank of Ohio
Estimating the losses on the asset portfolios for the four branches of the State Bank
of Ohio that failed is not as straightforward as it was for the case of failed banks in New York
and Vermont. The diﬃculty is that only note holders were covered under the State Bank of
Ohio mutual guarantee system, and the information in Golembe and Warburton (1958) is
the “Assessment for redemption of notes of failed Branch Banks, Amount collected.” There
is no information on the losses experienced by shareholders, depositors, or other creditors
which would be required to estimate the losses on the asset portfolio.
“Safe” “Risky”
Year Bank Assets assets assets % “Risky”
1852 Licking County 320,941 85,527 235,414 73.4
1854 Akron 419,676 104,004 315,672 75.2
Mechanics & Traders 318,881 93,048 225,833 70.8
Commercial, Toledo 637,176 199,991 437185 68.6
Average all four 72.0
Average NY Safety Fund 88.4
Average VT Safety Fund 89.1
Table 12: Riskiness of assets portfolios of branches of the State Bank of Ohio, 1851-1854
Because of this diﬃculty I looked instead at the “potential riskiness” of the asset
portfolios of the failed branches of the State Bank of Ohio in the last balance sheet in Weber
(2012) before they failed and compared it with the average “potential riskiness” of the asset
portfolios of the New York and Vermont Safety Fund banks before they failed. My measure
of potential riskiness is the total assets of a bank less “Due from other banks,” “Notes of
other banks,” and “Cash and cash items,” which I deemed to be safe assets, in the sense
that they would be subject to a low probability of loss. The results are given in Table 12.
The table shows that on average branches of the State Bank of Ohio that failed held less
risky portfolios than did banks that failed in New York and Vermont. Of course, this is
not direct evidence that losses on the portfolios of the failed branches of the State Bank of
Ohio were smaller, but it is suggestive that this could have been the case, consistent with
my hypothesis.
5. Summary and conclusion
This paper examines the experience of New York, Vermont, Ohio, and Indiana under
the diﬀerent schemes for insurance bank liabilities that were in place in each state. It ﬁnds
that the experience of these states in terms of the control of the moral hazard problem
associated with any kind of insurance scheme was quite diﬀerent. The paper’s hypothesis is
that these diﬀerences are consistent with the notion that a bank liability insurance scheme
control moral hazard to the degree that the banks involved in the scheme have the power
and incentive to take actions to control or modify other member banks’ risk-taking behavior.
16Under this hypothesis, the control of moral hazard should have been the least in
New York and Vermont, because banks had little incentive and little power to control the
risk-taking behavior of other banks in the system. The control over moral hazard should
have been the greatest in the State Bank of Indiana system, because both incentives and
power were quite strong. The control of moral hazard in the State Bank of Ohio system
should have been somewhere in between, because even though the incentives were about the
same as those in New York and Vermont, an individual branch had the same power over the
behavior of other branches and did the branches of the State Bank of Indiana.
This paper measures the control of moral hazard by how well bank suspensions were
prevented, how low was the rate of bank failures, and how small were the losses on bank
asset portfolios. The empirical evidence on bank failures and losses on bank asset portfolios
is largely consistent with the hypothesis. The control of moral hazard was the weakest in
New York and Vermont and the strongest in Indiana. The evidence on failures and losses
for the State Bank of Ohio is only roughly consistent with the hypothesis, however, because
its branches had roughly the same failure rates as banks in the New York and Vermont
safety funds. It is also the case that the evidence on bank suspensions is not consistent with
the hypothesis. However, there are good reasons to discount this evidence because of the
laws governing suspension of specie payments gave all banks the same incentives to avoid
suspensions,regardless of how they were insured or even if they were uninsured.
The lesson to be drawn from this exercise is that moral hazard in bank liability
insurance schemes can be well controlled if the individual participants have both signiﬁcant
”skin in the game” and the power to change the behavior of other participants. However, as
the contrast between experience of the branches of the State Bank of Ohio and the branches
of the State Bank of Indiana shows, the power to change the behavior of other participants
alone is not enough. Banks also have to have the incentive to modify the behavior of other
banks. Unfortunately, there was no insurance scheme in existence in this period that would
provide evidence about how well moral hazard would be controlled in a scheme in which
member banks had strong incentives to modify the behavior of other member banks, but
had little power to do so. Perhaps such such systems did not arise because they were not
feasible.
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